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Abstract
Australia has voluntary private health insurance (PHI) markets in which
open enrolment and community rated premiums are mandated by govern-
ment. Historically, adverse selection in these markets led to a substantial
decline in coverage, giving voice to fears about the viability of PHI markets
in the longer-run. In order to preserve community rating but improve the
PHI pool, the Australian Government instituted a novel scheme of age-
based penalties (ABPs) for individuals who join a PHI fund later in life.
This paper computes the price of health insurance under the so-called
Lifetime Cover (LC) scheme and shows that the LC scheme per se is not
appropriately calibrated to prevent another adverse selection death spiral
(Butler 2002). Based on our results, we recompute age-based penalties
that would result in a fair price of PHI for all age groups. The premium
multipliers we derive suggest a premium ratio of 10:1 for the oldest and
youngest joiners. Our premium multiplier sequence is well-approximated
by a linear ABP scheme that is approximately three times that of the
present LC scheme for older joiners.
<This page is blank>
1 Introduction
In most countries, private health insurance (PHI) membership is not compul-
sory. In voluntary PHI markets, an attendant problem is adverse selection:
many individuals who would benefit from buying private health insurance are
unwilling to do so, either because the premiums available exceed the expected
insurance benefits or because they are denied coverage due to discoverable
risk factors, such as chronic diseases.
In Australia, where PHI is voluntary and open enrolment is mandated,
an adverse selection death spiral (Butler 2002) had characterised PHI mar-
kets. In response to this problem, Australia has made a novel attempt to
counteract adverse selection through, inter alia, an age-based penalty (ABP)
scheme. Individuals who buy and maintain PHI avoid the ABP altogether.
Furthermore, those who maintain private health insurance are guaranteed to
have the option of being privately insured at the prevailing community-rated
premium, irrespective of their risk profile at any point in the future.
In the United States, it is well-known that many millions are uninsured.
The percentage of uninsured persons in the United States in 2001 was 5 times
higher for people aged 19 to 34 (40% uninsured) than for people aged 55-64
(8% uninsured) (Hoffman & Wang 2003) . One concern has been with the
denial of PHI cover to people with chronic diseases, or insurance offers that
entail prohibitively high (and perhaps unfair) premiums. Some states in the
U.S. have reacted by making the denial of coverage illegal through guaran-
teed issue and community rating laws (Herring and Pauly 2006b). Another
concern in the U.S. has been with the consequences of being reclassified as
high risk. The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA)
of 1996 ensures that high-risks cannot be dropped or have their premiums
increased by more than others insured by that firm. These policies may have
the unintended consequence of increasing the average risk level of those who
are insured; although recent work has found little evidence of this in individ-
ual markets (Herring and Pauly 2006b). Adverse selection implies that an
increased average risk level, in this case by mandating that private insurers
cover high risks at a premium below their expected benefit, may drive the
better risks among the insured out of the market or into low-risk pools in
other firms (Rothschild and Stiglitz 1976). This may result in a net reduction
in insurance rates at the population level and may lower economic welfare.
The Australian ABP scheme offers the following alternative: for those
who buy and maintain private insurance when they are young and relatively
healthy, there is guaranteed issue at the community rated premium, indepen-
dent of any subsequent risk level. If one becomes high risk while not privately
insured, however, while there is still guaranteed issue, an increasing ABP is
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also imposed on the PHI premium, and it applies for all subsequent insurance
periods. Thus, in a sense, the Australian arrangements are similar to those
in U.S. jurisdictions that have mandated guaranteed issue for the uninsured,
but have not regulated premiums. Both policies “punish” new joiners, either
by adding an ABP to the community rated premium or by allowing (per-
haps prohibitively) high risk-rated premiums. The Australian Government
also has pursued two more conventional policies to promote the purchase
of private health insurance: a tax on middle-to-high-income earners for not
buying PHI and a direct ad valorem subsidy on the insurance premium for
purchasers of PHI.
This paper examines the extent to which a range of private health in-
surance (PHI) policy measures in Australia have affected the price of PHI,
defined as the ratio of premiums to expected benefits, by age. Using data
on health insurance expenditures, by age, as well as data on hospitalisation
frequencies and episodic costs, we compute the price of PHI for each age
group in the Australian population with PHI and examine the dynamics of
prices and membership over time. We conclude that the propensity for an
adverse selection death spiral still exists in Australian PHI markets, but that
this has been kept in check by tax penalties that the Australian government
has imposed on middle-to-high-income earners who do not buy PHI. We also
offer an alternative scheme of age-based taxes that is nevertheless consistent
with the general framework of the existing LC scheme.
Background
Australia has a system of public insurance that is universal and compulsory.
Despite this fact, more than 40% of the population holds private health in-
surance (PHI) for hospitalisation. This is one of the highest rates of PHI
coverage in the world for countries with universal health care. This rela-
tively high rate of PHI coverage has, however, not been achieved without
considerable government intervention. Between 1984 and the late 1990s,
PHI coverage fell from 50% to 30.1% of the population as a result of adverse
selection in community-rated PHI markets. This has been characterised as
an adverse selection death spiral (Butler 2002). Over the past decade, the
Australian Government has made a number of attempts to raise the level of
PHI coverage in Australia by introducing a series of tax-and-subsidy mea-
sures and age-related late-joiner penalties to boost PHI coverage. The range
of measures has been discussed in some detail in the existing literature; see,
e.g. Hall, De Abreu Lourenco and Viney (1999), Butler (2002) and Brown
and Connelly (2005, 2006). Private health insurance coverage in Australia
has not only grown, but also appears to have stabilised in recent quarters.
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The measures in place in Australian PHI markets, at the time of writing,
include:
1. The subsidy (or rebate) on PHI policies.
2. The Medicare Levy Surcharge (MLS) tax on mid-to-high-income earn-
ers who do not have PHI.
3. The Lifetime Cover scheme, which penalises people who join the PHI
pool later in life. The ABP is calculated by taking the number of years
beyond 30 and multiplying this number by 0.02, or 2 percent. Note
that the penalty is paid in every year after initially purchasing PHI.
Specifically, the rebate applies to all PHI policies based on the age of the
oldest person covered. The subsidy is 30% of the premium paid for indi-
viduals 65 years, 35% of the premium paid for 65-69 year-olds, and 40% of
the premium paid for individuals 70 years and older. The subsidy may be
taken either as a reduction in the price of the policy at the time of purchase,
or as a tax rebate when an income tax return is filed. The MLS is payable
by individuals who earn $50,000 or couples/families that earn $100,000 but
do not have PHI; it is calculated as 1.0% of taxable income.1 The ABPs
essentially involve loading the base premium by a fraction that is calculated
as the number of years beyond 30 that a person first took out PHI, times
0.02 (e.g., a person who joined at 40 years pays a premium that is 1.2 times
the base premium for the duration of membership).
The Model Under standard insurance theory, when faced with a choice
between a risky income distribution with mean k and a certain income k, a
risk-averse individual prefers the latter. Thus, the welfare of a risk-averse
person is raised when he/she purchases health insurance at the actuarially
fair price (Arrow 1963):
Pi = ziHi (1)
where Pi is the actuarially fair premium for the ith individual, zi is the
probability of the loss event (e.g., of hospitalisation) for the ith individual
and Hi is the value of the loss (e.g., the cost of the hospital episode) to the ith
individual if the event occurs. Note that the premium (Pi) is in fact the price
of an insurance policy, not the price of insurance per se. The price of health
insurance (pi) is the price per dollar of expected benefit or, equivalently, the
ratio of the expected loss to the premium:
1Just prior to the publication of this Working Paper, the government announced that
the thresholds were to be increased to $100,000 for singles and $150,000 for couples.
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pi = Pi/ziHi (2)
Note that it follows from (1) that Pi/ziHi = $1.00 = p, i.e. by definition,
a premium is actuarially fair if the price per dollar of expected benefit is one.
Actuarially unfair prices for private health insurance are, however, com-
mon place in practice. Typically-emphasised reasons for this include the ex-
istence of asymmetries of knowledge between the insurer and insured about
risk and loss expectations, for administrative loadings, and monopoly pricing
(Rothschild and Stiglitz 1976). Institutional arrangements such as mandated
community rating, where low-expected-loss individuals (ls) pay the same pre-
mium for a policy as high-expected loss individuals (hs), also result in unfair
prices. There is also evidence, though, that cross-subsidisation also occurs
in experience-rated insurance markets (Herring and Pauly 2006a).
Under community rating, the premium for insurance is invariant with re-
spect to individual’s risk and loss expectations. For precisely this reason the
price of insurance, defined as the price per dollar of expected insurance ben-
efit, is not uniform across risk and loss types. Assuming only two risk types,
ls and hs, community rating may be characterised as a system of insurance
cross-subsidies (Pauly 1970, Pupp 1981) from ls to hs. In a competitive
community-rated insurance market with two risk types, no excess profits,
and no taxes or subsidies of insurance we may write:
Cpl = P + λlP (3)
Cph = P − λhP (4)
λl = λh (5)
Cpl > C
p
h, (6)
where Cpl is the price charged to low-expected-loss individuals, C
p
h is the price
charged to high-expected-loss individuals, λl is the premium loading for ls
and λh is the premium discount for hs. Under the assumptions above, Cpl >
$1.00 and Cph < $1.00, i.e. for every dollar of expected benefit, ls pay more
than one dollar and hs pay less than one dollar. Thus, the uniform premium
(P) results in unfair prices that are are favourable to hs and unfavourable
to ls. However, note that some ls may still find the purchase of insurance
welfare-maximizing: whether or not this is the case depends jointly on the
degrees of risk-aversion and premium unfairness.
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An aforementioned source of inefficiency that is associated with commu-
nity rating is adverse selection, wherein h-types are over-represented in the
PHI pool.
Let z¯ represent the mean risk in the population and H be the mean
loss. Thus, the community rated premium is zH. For an individual, the
premium payable for a given policy, under the Australian ABP scheme may
be represented as:
Cpi = (1 + A× 0.02)× zH −Ri (7)
where A is the number of years beyond 30 that a person first took out PHI
and Ri is the applicable (age-based) rebate/subsidy. The price of insurance,
as previously defined, (2), thus becomes
pi = C
p
i /ziHi = [(1 + A× 0.02)× zH −Ri]/ziHi (8)
The imposition of the ABPs is intended to attract and maintain customers
from an early age. In particular, the healthy young may insure against fu-
ture penalties, that would otherwise arise due to the ABP, by maintaining
insurance when pi is less than one. Thus, it is useful to sum (8) across all
ages after 30 and compute the implicit (real) annual price of PHI when it is
computed for a particular joining age. This necessitates adding subscript A,
which corresponds to the period of initial purchase past age 30, and L, which
corresponds to the point of death, as
pi =
L∑
A=1
CpiA/
L∑
A=1
ZiAHiA = [(1 + A× 0.02)× zH −RiA]/
L∑
A=1
ziAHiA
= (L− A)[ziAHiA/(1 + A× 0.02)× zH −
L∑
A=1
RiA] (9)
Now assume, for simplicity, that all three PHI measures apply to all
consumers (1. and 3., in fact, always do) and that this policy covers the
entire loss Hiof insured individuals, otherwise known as full insurance.
A utility-maximising individual’s decision whether or not to buy private
health insurance may be represented as a choice between an uncertain (unin-
sured state) income distribution with expected income-utility:
E(U) = zU(Y −H − T ) + (1− z)U(Y − T ); T = f(Y ;Y > 50, 000) (10)
where T is the MLS tax penalty, and the certain (insured state) income-
utility:
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U = U(Y − (1 + A× 0.02)× zH −Ri) (11)
Recall that Ri is positive for all purchasers of health insurance and T ≥ 0,
depending on income. Thus, neither of these measures is predicted to lower
the likelihood that good risks buy PHI. On the other hand, as has been
emphasised elsewhere (Brown and Connelly 2005, Connelly and Brown 2006)
the incentives produced by the age-based penalties of the ABP scheme do
not uniformly increase the attractiveness of insurance (i.e., increase (11)).
The ABPs could, for example, discourage older “low-risk” individuals from
initially taking out insurance while they remain low-risk.
The utility functions (10) and (11) are not estimable. However, recall from
(1) that a risk-averse individual will always choose the certain equivalent (11)
in preference to a risky distribution (10) with the same expected value. By
extension, one can infer that if the value of (8) > $1.00, the individual will
prefer to purchase insurance rather than self-insure. Of course, values of
(8) > $1.00 are sometimes consistent with welfare-maximizing purchase of
insurance for the reasons outlined above. We also estimate (9) based on the
youngest cohort in the sample. In this paper, we use these facts and the
available data to estimate the impact of an array of Australian Government
policies on the desirability of PHI.
2 Methods and Data
Using PHI industry data (PHIAC 2007) on membership and expenditures,
along with industry premium data, we estimate the price of private health
insurance by age and gender, simulate the effects of the applicable taxes
and subsidies on those prices, and compare them to actuarially fair (but
community-rated) premiums for 5-year age groups. Essentially, we estimate
(8) and (2) and compare the results of these to show whether the price of
insurance is actuarially fair in each age group. In addition, we compute the
expected income and certain income components of (9) and (10) for income
levels where the tax penalties apply and ask whether or not, solely on the
basis of the income tax implications, might individuals/families purchase an
insurance policy even though the premium is unfair (i.e., when (8)>(2))?
Finally, we produce some illustrative results of the ABP scheme and tax
provisions for low-risk old individuals who have not previously held PHI.
The only other work of this nature that has been conducted for Australia was
undertaken by Butler (1999). His work was, however, primarily concerned
with estimating elasticities for private health insurance and was conducted
for a pre-ABP period.
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The PHIAC (2007) data available to us are 5-year age-group aggregates,
by gender, disaggregated into hospital and ancillary PHI cover. The data do
not enable us to determine which members hold both hospital and ancillary
cover, so our exclusive focus is on the hospital PHI. Quarterly observations
are available on (i) the number of members, (ii) the proportion of the Aus-
tralian population with PHI, (iii) the total insurance benefits paid, and (iii)
the number of hospital episodes. Since the insured event is hospitalisation,
the mean probability of the insured event in the j th age group (zj) may be
derived by dividing (iii) by (i). Similarly, the mean cost per insured event for
the (insured) members of the j th age group (Hj) may be derived by divid-
ing (ii) by (i). This is the mean fair premium for the j th age group (zjHj)
derived. All price data were converted to constant 2006-2007 Australian dol-
lars. Due to seasonality in the quarterly series, we report annual means for
our series.
Detailed data on the characteristics (e.g., the inclusions and coinsurance
provisions) of hospital policies purchased were not available to us, nor was the
value of premiums collected. Furthermore no matching time-series of premi-
ums is available. Thus, in order to compute the price of insurance, we must
make an assumption about the policy types purchased. To be conservative,
we selected the lowest-price hospital PHI policy available from the largest
Australian private health insurer, Medibank Private Ltd. The policy chosen
is called “First Choice Hospital” and it contains the most basic inclusions
this insurer offers at the premium of $586.79 in Australia’s most populous
state, New South Wales (see www.medibank.com.au for details). There are
several reasons that this is a conservative assumption. First, this policy is
unlikely to be attractive to older consumers, high-expected-loss types, and
couples planning to use private hospital services for childbirth. Second, and
notwithstanding our assumption that full insurance is available, this policy
has some coinsurance provisions.
Finally, note that we do not know how the benefits data are distributed
as between individuals and households, let alone the family composition of
households that have PHI. Although family premiums are computed simply
as twice the singles premium, unfortunately the effect is not a simple linear
transformation with respect to the computation of our price (8) variable.
Specifically, when we compute the price of insurance for children of dependent
age, we essentially ignore the fact that the majority of these children must
be covered by parents’ or guardians’ policies. This is quite an important
limitation, which we address by constructing family unit scenarios towards
the end of the paper and recomputing the price of insurance.
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3 Results
Table 1 presents the central results on the price of health insurance, by age
group and gender, with and without the rebate. Recall that a premium (Pi) is
actuarially fair if it results in a price (pi)=$1.00 per dollar of expected benefit:
a price of more than $1.00 suggests a premium that is actuarially unfair
and unfavourable to the insured, while a price of less than $1.00 suggests
a premium that is unfair but favourable to the insured. The effect of the
rebate is, universally, to reduce the price of PHI. However, Table 1 shows
that the premiums for the 0-4 to 45-49 age groups are, on average, unfair
and unfavourable, with or without the subsidy. The premiums for women
and persons age 25-39 are unfair but favourable, presumably due to the
predominance of obstetrics and related services in this age group. Gross
premiums are closest-to-fair in the 50-54 years age group, but in all older
age groups are unfair but favourable to the insured. The effect of the rebate
on actuarial fairness, around this age group, is the most noteworthy: prices
net of the subsidy become actuarially unfair and favourable to the insured
around this age point. Notably, the price of insurance for the oldest old is
extremely low, with or without the rebate. Without the PHI rebate, 70+
year olds were paying twenty-three cents or less per dollar of expected PHI
benefit. With the 40% PHI rebate, this age group now pays less than fourteen
cents per dollar of expected benefit.
Finally, note that the first two columns of price data on ”persons” provides
an effective way of considering whether or not PHI premiums are fair, on
average, for an adult couple of the same age. The PHI premium for a couple
is simply double that of the singles premium.
Of course, the data presented in Table 1 depend on several simplifying
assumptions, the most important of which are that (i) the insured population
buys a prescribed individual, rather than family policy, and (ii) that the
policy chosen is the most frugal available. Additionally, the unfair prices in
Table 1 ignore the ABPs, which make policies for all age groups >25-29 more
expensive. Note, though, that the magnitudes of premiums for the oldest old
suggest that even the applying the maximum ABP scheme penalty– a 70%
premium loading for people who join at 65 years or older – may not be
particularly disuasive: 1.7 times the prices currently paid by these groups
still generates an actuarially unfair and favourable price for the oldest of the
old. Note that the lifetime average price of insurance for those over thirty is
$0.45 overall, $0.67 for men, and $0.39 for women.
Table 2 presents the results in Table 1 with the ABPs added by sex and
by age that a person initially purchased PHI. The subsidy and ABPs are
included. The first column lists the price of insurance p using equation (8).
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Table 1: Estimated mean prices of private health insurance in Australia, with
and without the private health insurance rebate, by gender and age
Mean annual prices (pA) and mean annual subsidised prices
(pA-RA) of private health insurance
(price per dollar of expected benefit)
Age for the Ath age group
Persons Males Females
pA pA-RA pA pA-RA pA pA-RA
0-4 $2.40 $1.68 $2.17 $1.52 $2.71 $1.90
5-9 $9.43 $6.60 $8.62 $6.04 $10.47 $7.33
10-14 $8.81 $6.17 $8.91 $6.23 $8.71 $6.10
15-19 $3.59 $2.51 $3.88 $2.72 $3.33 $2.33
20-24 $2.36 $1.65 $2.92 $2.04 $2.00 $1.40
25-29 $1.30 $0.91 $3.10 $2.17 $0.89 $0.62
30-34 $1.03 $0.72 $3.22 $2.25 $0.66 $0.46
35-39 $1.26 $0.88 $2.70 $1.89 $0.85 $0.60
40-44 $1.57 $1.10 $2.22 $1.55 $1.24 $0.87
45-49 $1.36 $0.96 $1.63 $1.14 $1.18 $0.83
50-54 $1.04 $0.73 $1.11 $0.78 $0.98 $0.68
55-59 $0.75 $0.53 $0.74 $0.52 $0.77 $0.54
60-64 $0.52 $0.36 $0.49 $0.34 $0.56 $0.39
65-69 $0.36 $0.24 $0.33 $0.22 $0.40 $0.26
70-74 $0.26 $0.16 $0.24 $0.14 $0.30 $0.18
75-79 $0.21 $0.13 $0.19 $0.11 $0.23 $0.14
80-84 $0.19 $0.11 $0.17 $0.10 $0.20 $0.12
85-89 $0.17 $0.10 $0.16 $0.10 $0.18 $0.11
90-94 $0.17 $0.10 $0.16 $0.09 $0.17 $0.10
95+ $0.19 $0.11 $0.17 $0.10 $0.19 $0.11
Note: Data are presented in 2006 Australian dollars (AUD1=USD0.74; 31 June
2006) and were computed using Equation (8).
Sources: Computed from PHIAC (2007) and Medibank Private Ltd (2007).
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For simplicity, we report the ages initially joined at the mid-points of the
age intervals in Table 1. For instance, for all persons, the price of insurance
for a 42 year old buying private insurance for the first time is $1.29, which
is actuarially unfair and unfavourable. Note that the tax mainly affects the
price of insurance at the highest ages, which is not surprising because it
increases with age. This is also the average price paid for insurance by age.
For instance, a person buying PHI for the first time at age 57 would pay an
average of $0.59 for PHI between the ages of 57 and 92, which is higher than
the average price of $0.45 per year if he or she initially bought PHI at age
30. The price is higher than he or she would pay without ABP or if he or she
was an insured at some point between ages 30 and 57. However, insurance
is still overwhelmingly actuarially unfair but favourable.
Clearly, the initial tax is too high, which may keep low risks from initially
buying PHI after age 30. This may in fact drive out low-risks under 40 who,
for whatever reason (liquidity constraints, temporary unemployment), did
not buy PHI at age 30 and therefore must pay the tax to initiate coverage. At
older ages, the increased expected expenditures far outweigh the tax penalties
for not maintaining PHI.
Thus, this combination of subsidies and ABPs may entice only the most
risk-averse to take out and maintain private insurance from age 30. Why,
then, has PHI membership recently stabilised as a proportion of the Aus-
tralian population? The income tax penalty (2.) – calculated at one per cent
of taxable income for individuals who earn over $50,000 and couples/families
that earn in excess of $100,000 – is the obvious explanation. Note, for ex-
ample, that the price of the insurance product we selected, net of the 30%
subsidy is $410.75 (=0.70 x $586.79), while the tax penalty for not having pri-
vate health insurance is $500 for a single person who earns $50,001. Clearly,
there is a strong financial incentive for mid-to-high income to buy PHI even
when the price actuarially unfair and unfavourable. Taxing individuals into
PHI is unlikely to be efficient though, for reasons that are well-established
(Pauly 1970).
Other Scenarios
As was outlined above, a serious limitation of the estimates presented in
Tables 1 and 2 is that they ignore the fact that, under family policies, depen-
dents essentially “free-ride”. This is an important issue because the effective
price for families with dependents will be lower than is suggested by the
data in Tables 1 and 2. In this section, we present some indicative simula-
tions of family purchasers of PHI. The simulations are conducted only for
those adult age groups in Table 1 for whom the price of insurance suggested
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Table 2: Estimated annual mean prices of private health insurance in Aus-
tralia by gender and joining age, with 2006 age-based penalties (ABPs)
Mean annual prices over the lifetime
Joining age Persons
(male/female
mean)
Males Females
pA pA pA
32 $1.00 $2.15 $0.68
37 $1.36 $1.92 $1.08
42 $1.29 $1.53 $1.11
47 $1.05 $1.12 $0.98
52 $0.82 $0.80 $0.83
57 $0.59 $0.56 $0.64
62 $0.41 $0.37 $0.44
67 $0.27 $0.24 $0.31
72 $0.22 $0.19 $0.24
77 $0.19 $0.17 $0.20
82 $0.17 $0.17 $0.19
87 $0.17 $0.15 $0.17
92 $0.19 $0.17 $0.19
Notes and Sources: As for Table 1.
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Table 3: Simulated annual mean prices of private health insurance in Aus-
tralia, with and without the private health insurance rebate, by couple age,
for couples with dependent children
Couples with...
Age of oldest
adult on
policy
One child Two children Three children Four children
pA pA-RA pA pA-RA pA pA-RA pA pA-RA
20-24 $1.08 $0.76 $0.81 $ 0.57 $ 0.65 $0.46 $0.62 $0.44
25-29 $0.70 $0.49 $0.58 $ 0.40 $ 0.49 $0.34 $0.47 $0.33
30-34 $0.58 $0.41 $0.49 $ 0.35 $ 0.43 $0.30 $0.42 $0.29
35-39 $0.69 $0.48 $0.57 $ 0.40 $ 0.48 $0.34 $0.47 $0.33
Notes: (i) Computed using Equation (8) and assuming that the household consists of
two adult parents/guardians in the same age range, plus dependent children;
(ii) based on the following assumptions: in family units three dependent
children or fewer, it is assumed that all dependents are in the 0-4 years age
group (this is the dependent age group with the highest expected benefit per
insured), while for family units with four dependents the eldest dependent
is assumed to be 5-9 years of age and the remaining three dependents are
assumed to be 0-4 years of age; (iii) presented in 2006 Australian dollars
(AUD1=USD0.74; 31 June 2006).
Sources: As for Table 1.
unfair individual premiums. The simulations assume that no LC penalties
are incurred. Dependents are assumed, conservatively, to be in the 0-4 age
range for household units with up to three dependents. This is the dependent
age range with the highest expected benefit per insured. Simulations with a
fourth dependent assume that the fourth child is in the 5-9 years age range.
The results are presented in Table 3.
Under these scenarios, most household units face actuarially unfair but
favourable prices, i.e. substantial cross-subsidisation from individuals to fam-
ilies with dependents is evident under the current arrangements. An obvious
way to introduce greater fairness in the premium structure is to recompute
family premiums as summations of fair age-based premiums for individuals.
In the next section, we produce the premium multipliers that enable this to
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be done, given the present composition of the PHI pool.
Lifetime fairness
What alternative scheme might work, that would improve efficiency, but
does not depend on harsh income tax penalties? Taking both community
rating and the “Lifetime Cover” principles as institutional constraints, our
answer is to impose a premium structure that creates fair lifetime premiums.
This can be achieved for any given joining age, by solving (9) for pi = 1.
Furthermore, assume that cross-subsidisation from singles to families is also
abolished: family premiums are determined as the summation of individual,
fair, lifetime policies.
Table 4 presents (second column) the premium multipliers that, if ap-
plied for a lifetime of PHI cover, result in fair annual premia for joiners in
each age group, on average.2 It also shows (third and fourth columns) the
material effects of these multipliers on premiums for two PHI products that
were offered by Medibank Private Ltd in 2006. These computations sug-
gest, for example, that children who are enrolled from birth (ages 0-4 ) and
maintain cover would pay just over half of the community-rated premium,
while individuals ages 70+ pay more than five times the community-rated
(or “base” premium. Note that this penalties-and-discounts scheme means
that the oldest first-joiners pay approximately ten times the premium that
is paid by individuals who have held PHI since early childhood.
Interestingly, for the five-year age groups represented in Table 4, a linear
regression also fits the data very well: with only a constant and age-step
“trend”, the coefficient of determination (R2) is approximately 0.95. The age-
based trend coefficient is 0.31. Since our regression uses five-year intervals,
this coefficient suggests that an ABP (or discount, as the case may be) of
the order of 6% per annum on average is a reasonable approximation to our
premium multipliers. This ABP is three times the magnitude of that which
currently applies under the Australian LC scheme, even when extended to
individuals ages <31.3
2We assume, arbitrarily, that the lifetime horizon is 96 years.
3This is somewhat ironic: the ABPs were actually weakened recently. The ABP is
now removed for late joiners after 10 years of continuous hospital table membership. Our
analysis does not take account of this change, which would strengthen the incentive effects
already illustrated.
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Table 4: Fair lifetime premium multipliers and annual premia by joining age
Joining age
Fair lifetime
premium
multiplier by
joining age
Estimated
premiums: most
basic policy (no
rebate)*
Estimated
premiums: most
comprehensive
policy (no
rebate)**
0-4 0.54 $317 $787
5-9 0.55 $323 $800
10-14 0.72 $420 $1,042
15-19 1.04 $611 $1,515
20-24 1.26 $737 $1,828
25-29 1.45 $848 $2,103
30-34 1.54 $905 $2,244
35-39 1.61 $948 $2,351
40-44 1.77 $1,037 $2,572
45-49 2.11 $1,237 $3,067
50-54 2.59 $1,520 $3,771
55-59 3.19 $1,873 $4,645
60-64 3.86 $2,268 $5,625
65-69 4.52 $2,650 $6,574
70-74 5.04 $2,959 $7,339
75-79 5.38 $3,155 $7,826
80-84 5.56 $3,260 $8,087
85-89 5.66 $3,321 $8,239
90-94 5.56 $3,260 $8,087
95+ 5.26 $3,088 $7,661
Notes: (i) *Based on the “First Choice Hospital” policy, with a current base premium
of $586.79; (ii) **based on the the “Blue Ribbon Hospital” policy, with a
current base premium of $1455.57; (iii) premium multipliers are computed
by setting pi = 1 in Equation (9); (iv) presented in 2006 Australian dollars
(AUD1=USD0.74; 31 June 2006) .
Sources: As for Table 1.
14
4 Discussion
In the U.S., many states have guaranteed issue laws for the uninsured. In the
individual market, high-risk individuals cannot be denied the right to pur-
chase health insurance. For those with insurance, HIPPA regulations ensure
that persons currently insured cannot be dropped or have their premiums
raised to prohibitively high levels. While these laws increase access for high-
risks, they may worsen the average risk profile of those insured, which may in
turn drive out relatively good risks. In Australia, there is an alternative pol-
icy. There is guaranteed issue, but with an age-based penalty for those who
initially buy PHI at older ages when they are relatively unhealthy. Those
who maintain insurance are not subject to the tax. The Australia age-based
tax scheme known as Lifetime Cover therefore has the potential to increase
access for high-risks without driving out low-risks.
Our results show the limitations of the three policies intended to cor-
rect for adverse selection. In particular, the non-linear age-based tax for
not maintaining PHI is too harsh on initial on initial non-purchasers and
too lenient on those initially buying insurance at higher ages. Applying,
for example, Herring and Pauly’s (2006a) finding that high-risk older males
consume approximately 8 times more benefits than low-risk males, one can
easily see that a cap on the maximum difference between premiums paid of
0.7 times will not induce low-risks to purchase and maintain PHI. Indeed, it
is interesting to note that our proposed premium multipliers lead to premium
relativities that are of the order discovered by Herring and Pauly (2006a).
Our proposal is likely to strike protestation on equity grounds. One may,
for example, object that young adults should not be captives of the historical
decisions of parents (i.e., be ineligible for a discount because their parents
did not buy PHI); that elderly people may be too harshly penalised by the
scheme (or have earned entitlements that we do not account for); and so
forth. A system of transfer payments may be an efficient way to address
equity concerns of this kind.
One important limitation of our study is that the data available to us
pertain to purchasers of PHI. One would typically expect the self-selected
pool to constitute an adverse selection of individuals, although some recent
evidence (Australian Bureau of Statistics 2006) suggests that the tax penal-
ties on mid-to-high income individuals for not purchasing PHI may confound
this prediction. In any event, improvements in the risk-composition of the
pool would necessitate recalibrations of the age-based tax rates we have pro-
posed here. Moreover, one would wish to base the initial calibration and
recalibration on more finely disaggregated industry data than are publicly
available.
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Finally, the Australian government has recently increased the MLS in-
come thresholds from $50,000 to $100,000 for singles and from $100,000 to
$150,000 for couples. Our results suggest that predictions of an exodus from
PHI by younger mid-to-high-income earners following this policy change are
well-founded, because the prices they face for private health insurance are
generally unfair. The modifications of the ABPs we propose are designed
make the price of insurance fairer and encourage younger people to join and
maintain PHI, without imposing punitive taxes on non-joiners.
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